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ABSTRACT 
 
Despite the large focus in research and practice on audit, inspections and oversight activities there 
has been few empirical studies showing the effects of auditing on public sector performance. 
Hence, we have little knowledge of whether auditing lead to positive, negative or no effects at all on 
the public sector. This paper argues that there is a need to connect empirical studies of auditing to 
an overall theoretical framework, defining what “good government auditing” consists of, in order 
to study if such auditing has positive effects on public sector performance. The paper presents a 
definition of good government auditing which builds on three core principles: independence, pro-
fessionalism and recognizing the people as the principal, which is operationalized and tested empir-
ically in the paper. Using data from a unique worldwide expert survey, covering 122 countries, the 
results clearly demonstrate that good government auditing has a distinct positive and statistically 
significant effect of the performance of the public sector. These findings indicate that merely con-
ducting audits of the public sector is not sufficient, auditing also needs to be organized according to 
certain principles, in order to contribute to well-functioning public administrations. 
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Introduction 
 
In the recent decade a large focus among scholars and practitioners within public administration 
has been the grand shift in the governance and control of the public sector. From central regulation 
and detailed instructions to decentralization, market solutions and ex-post controls, all within the 
New Public Management (NPM) reform package. This change increased the demand for oversight, 
inspection and audit of the public sector; to the extent that Power (1999) claimed that we are facing 
an “audit society.”  Power (1999) argued that this would have several undesirable consequences for 
society, and in line with him much of the literature has in general been focused on the harmful 
impact of inspection and audit activities. It has been argued that by making organizations auditable, 
the measurability of activities becomes more important than the kind of activities carried out in the 
organizations. This in turn has been argued to lead to lower levels of efficiency, de-
professionalization and mistrust and resistance among public employees (Bevan and Hood 2006; 
Dahlström and Lapuente 2010; Levi 2005; Pentland 2000; Power 1996; 1999). Although many 
scholars have tended to highlight the negative effects, there have only been a limited number of 
empirical studies demonstrating the impact of oversight, inspections and audit on public sector 
performance (Andrews et al. 2008; Boyne 2003; Cabral and Lazzarini 2014; Walker, Boyne and 
Brewer 2010).  
 
Existing empirical studies provide a mixed picture of how monitoring activities, such as auditing, 
impact the performance of public sector organizations. Some studies demonstrate positive correla-
tions, other insignificant or negative correlations between auditing and better public sector perfor-
mance (Bevan and Hood 2006; Boyne 2003; Carlson, Cowen and Fleming 2013; Rutherford 2014). 
The same kind of audit activity has also been demonstrated to impact performance in different 
ways in the same organization. In her study of underperforming schools, Rutherford (2014) finds 
that audit interventions in schools increased their performance on some indicators at the same time 
as there were no improvements on other performance indicators. Although Rutherford (2014) ar-
gues that monitoring can lead to improvements, a common counter argument in the literature is 
how performance improvements in some areas most likely has negative consequences in other 
areas, as a result of resources and focus primarily being directed to the areas being subject to audits 
(Bevan and Hood 2006).  
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Hence, auditing appears to impact public performance in different ways and as a part of the expla-
nation of when it generates positive outcomes, a line of research has demonstrated that the manner 
by which auditing is organized may be significant. Mainly, these studies have been centered on how 
the communication of audit results can play an important role. Result of audits have proved to 
impact the performance in the organization positively when the results of the audits have been 
made public for citizens (Carlson, Cowen and Fleming 2013; Bevan and Hood 2006; Ferraz and 
Finan 2008). In particular, such information has proved to be significant in de-centralized public 
sectors with market solutions, where citizens are allowed to choose among various service provid-
ers. To be able to make a choice, citizens need information and public service providers need to 
perform well in published reports in order to attract citizens as “customers” (Carlson, Cowen and 
Fleming 2013). In addition, the source of performance information has also proved to be im-
portant. In comparison with performance information produced by the mass media, the public 
service provider itself or the local government, citizens are more likely to trust information pro-
duced by auditing bodies which are independent (James 2010). Additionally, the capacity of the 
auditing agency, in terms of expertise and skills among the auditors has been demonstrated to im-
pact their possibility of fulfilling their assignment. In particular in poor countries, capacity con-
straints in terms of lack education and expertise among auditors put large limitations on how audit-
ing agencies in these countries may operate (Gustavson 2014; Isaksson and Bigsten 2012).  
 
Almost all countries around the world have an established national auditing agency, monitoring the 
performance of the entire public sector in their country. These national auditing agencies do how-
ever vary in several significant aspects, such as structure, degree of professionalism, degree of inde-
pendence from the government and whether they communicate their results to the public. As 
demonstrated, previous research emphasize some of these characteristics to be important for gen-
erating better public sector performance. These characteristics are however not connected to an 
overall theoretical understanding of how auditing should be organized in order to generate better 
public sector performance, or empirically tested more systematically (c.f. Boyne, Day and Walker 
2002; Cabral and Lazzarini 2014; Walker, Boyne and Brewer 2010). In addition, existing empirical 
research on the impact of auditing on public sector performance consists of studies of single public 
sectors organizations or single fields within the public sector, such as health care or schools, within 
the same country. This study aims to expand this field of research through examine how “good 
government auditing” impact public sector performance in a cross-national comparative study.   
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Theory: The organization of auditing and its impact on public sector 
performance 
 
Oversight of the public sector is commonly described theoretically as following the logic of the 
principal-agent problem (Bendor, Glazer and Hammond 2001; McCubbins, Noll and Weingast 
1987; Weingast 1984). As the principles – the political representatives and, ultimately, the people – 
delegate the execution of the public affairs to the agents – the public officials – the need to control 
their actions and performances raises. If there would be no oversight of public officials, there 
would be an impending risk of policy drift, shirking or corruption in the public sector organizations 
(McCubbins, Noll and Weingast 1987). This need for control is enforced by the asymmetric rela-
tionship in information between the principals and the agents. In particular, in modern societies 
with highly complex and specialized administrations, political representatives and ordinary citizens 
may have a difficult time in constituting a sufficient democratic control, merely through access and 
insight in the public sector organizations. This has given rise to the need for specific government 
agencies controlling other parts of the public sector, such as auditing or inspection agencies 
(O’Donnell 1999; Scott 2000).  Apart from this overarching theoretical understanding of the need 
and purpose of auditing agencies in democracies, there is no established comprehensive theoretical 
framework to understand how the organization of such agencies affect the performance of the 
administration being audited (c.f. Boyne, Day and Walker 2002). However, various features are by 
different scholars emphasized as generating better outcomes of an audit process.  
 
Principles of good government auditing1   
 
I argue that there are three main principles which in the literature are established, although sepa-
rately, as principles of what may be considered essential elements in a definition of “good auditing” 
of the public sector. The first is the principle of independence (Flint 1988; Mautz and Sharaf 1961; 
Normanton 1966; Power 1999; 2005; Hollingsworth and White 1998). If we regard auditing as a 
mechanism for the principal to control the agent, the separation between the agent and the auditing 
agency becomes central. If there is no separation between the oversight mechanism and the public 
administration subjected to control, the oversight mechanism would rather work as a function for 
                                                     
1
 This section builds on Gustavson (forthcoming) What is Good Government Auditing? Seeking the Democratic Founda-
tions of a Horizontal Accountability Mechanism 
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self-evaluation (Wildavsky 1979). Internal auditing serves as such mechanism, and operates as an 
internal control function for management to evaluate and control the organization. Although it may 
be a valuable instrument for management in the public sector, for politicians and the public to en-
hance efficiency and prevent policy drift, fraud and corruption in the administration relying on self-
evaluative mechanisms have severe limitations. In order to present a successful picture of the or-
ganization, there is an immediate risk that self-estimations overvalue performance and downplay 
underperformance and other problems in the organization. The history of auditing in democracy 
theory also illustrates how independence has been an essential element in the relationship between 
the auditors and the public administration. In The Politics Aristotle regarded it as necessary that offi-
cials handling public money were controlled by other officials who were separated from them and 
had no other function: But since some, not to say all, of these offices handle the public money, there must of neces-
sity be another office which examines and audits them, and has no other function.  (Aristotle, The Politics, Book 
VI, 1322b5-15). Similar to Aristotle, John Stuart Mill clarifies the need to create systems of control 
of the administration and the necessity to separate “these offices of control and criticism” from the 
administration whose work they are to examine (Mill, (1861) 2001, p. 70). As independence is well 
established as a cornerstone in auditing, the issues discussed in the literature is not whether or not 
independence is necessary, but rather how various dimensions of independence can be guaranteed, 
such as financial independence, protection from interference in planning, selecting and executing 
audits and individual ethics among auditors (Antle, 1984; Bayou, Reinstein and Williams, 2011; 
Cullinan and Sutton, 2002; Gendron, Cooper and Townely 2000; Preston et al., 1995; Sikka and 
Willmott, 1995; INTOSAI 1998).  
 
The second principle of “good government auditing” is professionalism. The creation of specific au-
diting agencies builds on the notion that officials working for these agencies have better possibili-
ties than ordinary citizens and politicians to control financial transactions and performance of very 
complex organizations, as public administrations constitute in contemporary societies. Professional-
ism among officials conducting oversight activities is also argued by scholars to generate better 
outcomes in terms of improving performance of the auditee (Boyne, Day and Walker 2002; Gus-
tavson 2014; Isaksson and Bigsten 2012). A lack of professional expertise creates more dependency 
to the auditee and more limited possibilities to take a critical stance to the information obtained in 
the audit process (Isaksson and Bigsten 2012) as well as it impacts the trustworthiness of their as-
sessments, opinions and reports negatively (Flint 1988). In addition to the purpose of controlling 
the public sector, auditing also build on recommendations to the auditee with the aim to improve 
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its performance (Reichborn-Kjennerud 2013). If these recommendations actually should lead to 
improvements, the understanding of the area by the auditors must be greater than that of the public 
officials working in these organizations (c.f. Boyne, Day and Walker 2002, pp. 1199). 
 
In comparison with other oversight agencies, constituting a specific profession has implications for 
how the expertise among auditors is governed. A profession is defined by the claim for abstract 
knowledge and the application of such knowledge to particular cases (Abbott 1988, p. 8). In order 
to withhold the legitimacy for the profession, professional groups exercise authority and control of 
their members in several ways. The entrance to the profession is generally regulated through de-
mands for specific education and exams, and, apart from national legal frameworks, the continuous 
work is internally regulated through requirements of following professional norms, such as specific 
standards and guidelines (Byington, Sutton and Munter 1990; Bédard 1989; Preston et al. 1995). A 
part of the trust in auditors’ competence is also based on whether they follow the norms estab-
lished by the profession for their work (Gustavson and Rothstein 2013). As a consequence of this, 
the auditing profession has handled external threats to their self-regulation and professional mo-
nopoly by an increased issuance of standards and guidelines (Power 2003). In particular in the af-
termath of financial crisis and auditing scandals, the reassurance of auditing independence and eth-
ics by the profession has been to emphasize the importance of following professional standards in 
the auditing work (Sikka 2009) Albeit standards are soft regulation and there is no legal obligation 
of compliance (Brunsson and Jacobsson 2000), their importance is demonstrated when assessments 
are made to determine whether the auditors have failed to properly execute her or his assignment. 
In court decisions on charges of professional negligence, the professional standards are used as 
indicators measuring whether appropriate and sufficient work has been carried out (Byington, Sut-
ton and Munter 1990).  
 
The third and last principle which I argue constitutes the foundation of good government auditing 
is recognizing the people as the principal. The organization of public administrations in democratic socie-
ties can be described as a chain of delegation. The people delegate authority to elected politicians 
who in turn delegate power to various public agencies, their management and the individual public 
officials. Who should be considered the principal in this vertical accountability framework then 
depends on where we focus in the chain of delegation (Brandsma and Schillemans 2012). Although 
delegation builds on a movement of who should be considered the principal, from a democratic 
perspective it can be argued that the main principle, whose will and power is delegated, ultimately 
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always is the people. The question then becomes how auditing can be organized to enable the peo-
ple to become a true principal, towards whom auditing agencies hold the public sector organiza-
tions to account?   
 
Auditors have been criticized for not acting in stakeholders, such as the citizens, interests, and for 
not being concerned about whether society holds other expectations on them than what they con-
sider their responsibility (Cullinan and Sutton 2002; Larsson 2005; Sikka 2009, Öhman et al. 2006). 
An area where this gap of expectations between auditors and the general public becomes notable is 
in terms of whether it is the responsibility of auditors’ to discover and report on fraud and corrup-
tion. Power (1999) claims that it has long been debated among scholars whether such malpractices 
should be a part of auditing, and according to him the debate come to a general agreement in the 
1940s that it should not be a part of the audit objectives, even if it might have been a purpose when 
auditing was established. However, the general public still believes and expects that these malprac-
tices are detected and reported upon by auditors, even if the auditing profession argues that this is a 
misunderstanding from the public side about the role and responsibility of auditors (Larsson 2005). 
Turing to the democratic origins of auditing, it becomes clear how the establishment of a public 
audit office in the democracy primarily was a matter of detecting maladministration such as embez-
zlement, bribes and other forms of corruption: If they [the auditors] detect anyone who has been guilty of 
embezzlement, the jury condemns him for theft of the public money /…/ if they demonstrate that anyone has taken 
bribes /…/ If they condemn him for maladministration /…/ (Aristotle, The Constitution of Athens XLIX 
LIV2). It is evident that the audit assignments need to change when society is modernized and the 
audited administrations becomes more complex. It yet appears as if the auditing profession has 
altered their role and responsibility to the extent that their democratic purpose has been lost. If they 
are not to discover and prevent fraud and corruption in the public sector, then who is? In line with 
the third principle of recognizing the people as the principal, there is a need for auditing agencies to 
start acting in the interest of the principal, subsequently start fulfilling the people’s expectations on 
their role and responsibility in society. To act in the interest of the principal also has implications of 
how to arrange the relationship between the people and the auditing agency. How audit reports and 
recommendations are taken into account by the administrative management and the political lead-
ership vary, which in turn, of course, also has consequences on how auditing may impact the ad-
ministrations (Freides 1992; Hanberger 2009; Andersson and Bergman 2009). If the people are to 
be regarded as the main principal, there should be little room for the variation of the impact of 
auditing to depend primarily on how findings and reports are handled by the administrative man-
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agement and the political leadership. Especially, considering that a large majority of fraud and cor-
ruption problems tend to involve top management (Cullinan and Sutton 2002). To fulfill the third 
principle, auditing agencies need to have a higher ambition than merely report to management and 
politicians. They also have to reach out to the general public to bring attention to their findings. 
Naturally, there is no possibility to inform the general public of all audit findings, but auditing 
agencies need to seriously consider what would be the most fruitful way of handling audit findings, 
with regard to the public’s interest. This includes communicating also audit results to the public, 
which are inconvenient for the government. As demonstrated by previous studies, result of audits 
have proved to impact the performance in the organization positively when the results of the audits 
have been made public for citizens (Carlson, Cowen and Fleming 2013; Bevan and Hood 2006; 
Ferraz and Finan 2008). 
 
In sum, I have outlined three main principles of what may be considered good government audit-
ing, from a democratic perspective, and I suggest the following definition: Good government auditing is 
characterized by recognizing the people as the principal, independence to the auditee and professionalism in the exercise 
of the audit practice. The overall theoretical understanding is thus that these principles together organ-
ize auditing in a way which generates a better performing public sector, i.e. in countries where na-
tional auditing agencies have high scores on these principles; they also have high scores on how 
well the public sector works. This leads to the following hypothesis:  
 
H1: If the national auditing agency is characterized by good government auditing, it generates better public sector 
performance   
 
Although the overall theoretical understanding of what characterizes good government auditing 
builds on the three principles in combination, it is reasonable to assume that each one of the prin-
ciples have an independent effect on how well the auditing may generate a good performing public 
sector. That is, if the auditing agency is independent it will have greater possibilities to monitor the 
public sector in a manner which will lead to better performance. Likewise, if the auditors who work 
in the national auditing agencies have the appropriate skills and education, they will be able to con-
duct the audits in a way which produces better performance of the public sector, as well as if they 
communicate their results to the public regularly, it is likely that their results will lead to an impact 
which eventually generate a better public sector performance. This leads to the following three 
hypotheses:  
  10 
 
H2: If the national auditing agency is independent from the government, it generates better public sector performance 
H3: If the national auditing agency is professional, i.e. have the appropriate skills and education, it generates better 
public sector performance  
H4: If the national auditing agency regularly communicates their results to the public, it generates better public sector 
performance 
 
 
Data and methods  
 
To capture the performance of the public sector cross-nationally, this paper uses the definition and 
measure of quality of government established by Rothstein and Teorell (2008), who define quality 
of government as impartiality in the exercise of public authority. Impartiality is a more inclusive def-
inition of the quality of the administration than just the absence of corruption. For public officials 
to be impartial it also means that apart from corruption they can neither be involved in related 
practices such as nepotism, patronage or discrimination. It is also a more precise definition than the 
World Bank’s definition of good governance, as the latter include all kinds of institutions through 
which public authority is exercised, which range from the formulation of sound policies to social 
norms among people (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2009).To measure impartiality this paper 
uses original data from the Quality of Government Expert Survey 2015. The survey is based on 
1294 country experts, covering 122 countries. Each country is represented by three or more experts 
(Dahlström et al. 2015a). The paper uses an index of impartiality which builds on five questions in 
the survey. Each measure was weighted by factor loading from a principal component factor analy-
sis and added to the index. Aggregation to country level was then made through using the mean 
value of all experts per country. The index is constructed so that high values on the index represent 
high levels of impartiality. The following five items from the survey was included in the index: 1) 
Whether some groups in society are treated unfairly when policies are implemented in individual 
cases; 2) If strong personal contacts are favored when public officials grant licenses to start up pri-
vate firm; 3) To what extent public sector employees act impartially when deciding on implement-
ing a policy in an individual case; 4) If firms that provide the most favorable kickbacks to senior 
officials are awarded public procurement contracts in favor of firms making the lowest bid; 5) How 
large percentage of the money directed to the needy poor will actually reach the needy poor (Dahl-
ström et al. 2015b). 
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To measure the independent variable, I follow my proposed definition of what constitutes good 
government auditing. Three specific questions capturing each one of the three principles was posed 
in the above described Quality of Government Expert Survey. The questions were asked the fol-
lowing way: To what extent would you say the following applies today to the country for which you 
have chosen to submit your answers? 1) The National Audit Office is independent from the gov-
ernment. 2) Auditors at the National Audit Office have the appropriate education and qualifica-
tions. 3) The National Audit Office regularly communicates their results, including results that may 
be inconvenient for the government, to the general public. Apart from a “no answer” option, the 
answer options range from 1 to 7, where 1 represent “not at all” and 7 “to a very large extent.” The 
answers were aggregated to country level by taking the mean of all experts per country. The good 
government auditing index was then created through taking the mean of the values for the three 
questions (Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.939). Figure 1 demonstrates the bivariate relationship between the 
good government auditing index and the quality of the bureaucracy.  
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FIGURE 1, BIVARIATE RELATIONSHIP, GOOD GOVERNMENT AUDITING AND THE QUALITY OF 
THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION  
 
 
 
 
As we see there is a fairly strong bivariate correlation between how well the national auditing agen-
cy is experienced to function and the quality of the public administration (R² = 0.644). As expected, 
the Nordic countries are found at the right top corner, together with countries like New Zealand, 
the Netherlands, Germany and France, with a good government auditing and well working public 
administrations. The fact that countries representing different kinds of auditing systems, i.e. the 
parliamentarian system (the Nordic countries, New Zealand and Germany) and the juridical system 
(France and the Netherlands), are found in the top indicates that it may not matter what kind of 
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audit system is established in the country as long as it is an independent professional auditing agen-
cy which communicate with the general public. At the bottom left corner we find countries such as 
Afghanistan, Venezuela, Tajikistan and Bangladesh, countries where the quality of the public sector 
is experienced as being very low, these countries are also distinguished by not having a well working 
national auditing agency.  
 
To ensure that the correlations not merely reflects general levels of economic development and to 
capture other alternative explanations, the model presented in Table 1 includes several control vari-
ables which in cross country comparative studies are regarded as factors creating quality of the 
public administrations. To control for economic development I use the gross domestic product (GDP) 
per capita in current prices by Gleditsch (2010) International integration has proved to be a signifi-
cant factor affecting the levels of corruption in a country (Sandholtz and Gray 2003). In the models 
international integration is specified through using three different measures. The first is trade open-
ness in the country, which is measured by the sum of exports and imports divided by GDP (World 
Bank Development Indicators 2010). The second and third are two indices from Axel Dreher’s 
globalization indices (2010). Political globalization is an index of the number of high commissions and 
embassies in the country, the number of international organizations the country is member of, the 
number of UN peace missions the country has participated in and the number of international 
treaties the country has signed since 1945. The social globalization index is constructed by three cate-
gories of indicators. The first indicator is personal contacts and includes measures on as telephone 
traffic, transfers (percent of GDP) international tourism, foreign population (percent of total popu-
lation) and international letters per capita. The second indicator is data on information flows, which 
includes number of internet and television users (per 1000 people) and trade in newspapers (per-
cent of GDP). Data on cultural proximity constitutes the third category of indicators, and it con-
sists of the number of McDonald’s restaurants and number of Ikea (both per capita) as well as 
trade in books (percent of GDP). I also include a dummy variable for whether or not the country 
has been a British colony (from Hadenius and Teorell 2007), as several scholars have argued that 
the British left norms and legal structures in their colonies which after independence made these 
countries perform comparatively better than other former colonies, in terms of having administra-
tions based on the rule of law (Bäck and Hadenius 2008; Charron and Lapuente 2010; La Porta et 
al. 1999; Treisman 2000). A part of good government auditing is the communication of audit find-
ings to the general public, hence, to ensure that the relevance of auditing agencies on the quality of 
the administration is not instead capturing levels of press freedom in the country, a measure of 
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Freedom of the Press (from Freedom House, 2010) is added as a control variable into the models. The 
variable was reversed so that high scores indicate high levels of press freedom.  
 
Results  
 
Table 1 presents seven empirical models where the hypotheses in the paper are tested. Model 1 – 5 
uses the impartiality index as the dependent variable. The first and most restrictive model tests the 
first hypothesis that good government auditing lead to a better performing public administration 
but includes only the control variables which are the most established in research on what may 
determine the quality of the bureaucracy cross-nationally. That is, GDP per capita, trade openness 
and being a former British colony (Bäck and Handenius 2008; Charron and Lapuente 2010; Dahl-
ström, Lapuente and Teorell 2012; La Porta et al. 1999; Treisman 2000). We see that the index of 
good government auditing has a relatively strong effect, with a coefficient of .298, significant at the 
0.01 level, despite adding these controls. As expected GDP per capita has an independent signifi-
cant effect. More surprisingly, neither trade openness nor being a former British colony have signif-
icant effects in the analysis. In model 2, the first hypothesis is tested in an extended model, in 
which political and social globalization as well as press freedom are added as control variables. As 
the results demonstrate, the impact of good government auditing drops only a little bit and it stays 
significant at the .01 level. Freedom of the press has only a marginal significant effect and the three 
variables controlling for internationalization dimension, trade openness, political and social globali-
zation show no significant impact. The clear and statistically significant impact of good government 
auditing on public sector performance despite controlling for these factors is a bit unexpected, but 
it reveals the importance of how auditing is organized for its possibility to have a positive impact 
on the public sector, a neglected dimension in previous research. In accordance with the theory, the 
three principles of good government auditing are also expected to have independent effects on 
public sector performance. Hence, in model 3 the second hypothesis is tested: If the national audit-
ing agency is independent from the government, it generates better public sector performance. 
Model 4 investigates hypothesis three: If the national auditing agency is professional, i.e. have the 
appropriate skills and education, it generates better public sector performance, and model 5 tests 
hypothesis four: If the national auditing agency regularly communicates their results to the public it 
generates better public sector performance. To run the full extended regression model with each of 
the  
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three parts in the good government auditing index also makes it possible to see if any of the parts in 
the index is more important than others, and perhaps driving the results for the whole index.  
Model 3- 5 illustrates how each of the principles of good government auditing has a clear impact on 
the quality of the bureaucracy, significant at the .01 level. In the light of the literature on auditing 
which primarily emphasize the importance of independence; it is somewhat surprising to see how 
the principle of independence demonstrates the weakest effect of the three principles, with a coeffi-
cient of .199. The strongest effect is found on professionalism ( .328) while communication places 
itself in the middle, with an effect of .236. As we see, there is no large difference between the three 
principles, however. In model 5, it is interesting to note how communicating audit results to the 
public remains significant with a relatively high impact on the dependent variable, even when free-
dom of the press is controlled for. Although these results are in line with previous studies demon-
strating how people trust performance information from independent auditing agencies more than 
media in general (James 2010), for a broader audience, freedom of the press would likely be regard-
ed as more important to sustain a well performing bureaucracy, as several studies have demonstrat-
ed how press freedom has a significant impact on levels of corruption (e.g. Brunetti and Weder 
2003). Similar to model 2, GDP per capita and freedom of the press remain significant in all three 
regressions while the other control variables show no significant impact.  
 
In model 6 and 7 the robustness of the results are tested by changing the dependent variable, in 
model 6 to government effectiveness (World Bank Governance Indicators, 2010) and in model 7 to 
levels of corruption (Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index, 2012). The scale for 
the corruption perception index is arranged so that higher values indicate lower levels of corrup-
tion. The coefficient for good government auditing drops slightly in model 6 but it still has a clear 
impact and remains significant at a .01 level. Changing the dependent variable to government effec-
tiveness made social globalization become significant at a .01 level, although its effect is rather lim-
ited with an estimated effect of .013. Using perceptions of corruption as the dependent variable in 
model 7, the effect of good government auditing increases but its significance levels drops a little to 
the .05 level. A similar change is noted for GDP per capita (an increase in the effect but a drop in 
the significance level), while the effect press freedom increases and remains significant at the .01 
level. As the principle of having professional auditors demonstrated the strongest effect of the part 
of good government auditing, the robustness of the results is also tested by controlling for multi-
collinearity with professionalization of the bureaucracy in general. Previous research has shown 
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how meritocratic recruitment of public officials has a strong and significant effect on levels of cor-
ruption (Dahlström, Lapuente and Teorell 2012), hence there could be a risk that this part of the 
index instead captures professionalization in general. To control for this, the index of professionali-
zation in the Quality of Government Expert Survey 2015 is used, which measures to what extent 
the public administration is professional rather than politicized. Higher values indicate a more pro-
fessional administration (Dahlström et al. 2015b). As expected the correlation between the profes-
sionalization index and audit professionalism is high (Pearson correlation = .691) and significant at 
the .01 level, however the values are not as high as signaling problems of multicollinearity. To fur-
ther control for multicollinearity I run a regression model with impartiality if the public administra-
tion as the dependent variable and the professionalism index and audit professionalism as inde-
pendent variables. For this model, the collinearity diagnostics a shows a VIF value of 1.880, thus, 
not indicating any problems with multicollinearity between the variables. To make additional tests 
of the robustness of the results I run two regression models including the professionalization index 
as a control variable.  
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The results are presented in Table 2. As we see in model 1, the effects of good government auditing 
drops from .298 (model 2, Table 1) to .195, when general professionalization of the public admin-
istration is added to the model. It remains however to have a clear impact which is significant at the 
.01 level. Similarly, the effect of audit professionalism, drops from .328 (model 4, Table1) to .210 in 
model 2 (Table 2), but it remains significant at the .01 level. As expected, the general professional-
ism index have higher impact on the quality of the publicly administration than the good govern-
ment auditing index and audit professionalism, with coefficient values of .315 (model 1) and .310 
(model 2) which are significant at the .01 level. Although the effects of auditing drops to some ex-
TABEL 2
Robustness Test Good Government Auditing
Model 1 Model 2
Good Gov Auditing Index 0.195***
(0.039)
Audit professionalism 0.210***
(0.045)
Proffessional PA 0.315*** 0.310***
(0.049) (0.050)
Number of countries 103 104
Constant -3.091 -3.218
(0.605) (0.613)
Adjusted R² 0.818 0.817
Note : The estimates are unstandardized regression coefficients with
standardized errors in parentheses. For both models the dependent 
variable is the "impartiality index"from the QoG Survey 2015. The models 
include the same control variables as model 2 in Tabel 1; GDP/Capita, 
Trade openness, political and social globalization, former British colony 
and Freedom of the Press. *p < 0.10; **p< 0.05; ***p < 0.01
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tent when general professionalism is added to the models, the effect of good government auditing 
on the quality of the public administration  remains clear and statistically significant, which adds 
robust support to the initial findings.  
 
Concluding discussion  
 
To verify and control how resources are used when they are handled by others than the original 
owner is a normative procedure which has a long history in different kinds of societies around the 
globe, in autocracies as well as in democracies. In our contemporary world almost all countries have 
a national auditing office, to monitor and evaluate the finances and the performance of the public 
administration in order to ensure that the public resources are used correctly and in an efficient 
manner. Nonetheless, if auditing actually leads to a well performing public administration is a ques-
tion which has not been answered properly in previous research. Several scholars have raised the 
fear that auditing has a negative impact on the organizations being subjects to audit, leading to mis-
trust, de-professionalization and a bias for activities being measurable instead of focusing on the 
substance of the activities. The empirical studies on the impact of auditing on public sector perfor-
mance have been limited and in general focused on single organizations or single fields within the 
public sector, in the same country. Research on auditing and inspection activities on organizations 
have also demonstrated mixed results, where some studies show a positive impact and others a 
negative or no impact at all. A reason for the mixed results as well as the fears scholars have risen 
about auditing could be the lack of an overall theoretical framework, establishing what may consti-
tute “good auditing” of the public sector. In a similar manner as it is not certain that merely “gov-
ernance” will lead to any positive outcomes in a country, to simply have “auditing” does not ensure 
that the administration is monitored in a way which is beneficiary for how it operates. Scholars 
have defined and debated what constitutes “good governance” or “quality of government” as hav-
ing this in a country have proved to lead to several positive outcomes, such as less poverty, lower 
child mortality, better health among the citizens (Azfar and Gurgur 2005; Gupta, Davoodi and 
Alonso-Terme 2002, Holmberg, Rothstein and Nasiritousi 2009) and. I have argued that there are 
three core principles upon which a definition of “good government auditing” should be built and in 
this paper these principles have been operationalized and tested empirically.  
 
The results evidently demonstrate that if auditing is organized according to these principles it has a 
distinct and statistically significant positive influence on the performance of public sector, even 
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when controlling for several alternative explanations and altering the measures of a well performing 
public administration. Auditing independence demonstrates the weakest effect of the three princi-
ples when they are tested separately, which, in the light of the literature is fairly surprising, as inde-
pendence is regarded as the cornerstone in auditing. Instead, audit professionalism demonstrates 
the most positive impact on public sector performance. These results are in line with previous re-
search illustrating how a high degree of knowledge in the area being monitored by the people con-
ducting controls is highly significant for the possibilities to have a positive impact of the control 
(c.f. Boyne, Day and Walker 2002). In particular, in poor countries, which also tend to have the 
largest problems with malfunctioning public sectors, to have auditors with appropriate skills and 
education have in previous studies also been demonstrated to be crucial for the auditing agency to 
fulfill its assignment (Gustavson 2014; Isaksson and Bigsten 2012). Although audit professionalism 
demonstrates the strongest effect, the differences between effects of the “good government audit-
ing” index and each of the three principles are not very large. This indicates that each part of good 
government auditing is central in order to create a public sector of high quality.   
 
The main policy implication of these findings is to continue to support national auditing agencies in 
development countries through various development cooperation programs, as it proves to be an 
important factor contributing to better functioning public sectors. A high quality public administra-
tion has in turn been demonstrated to generate several good outcomes in society, such as lower 
child mortality, less poverty, better health among the population. Hence, as auditing, according to 
the results in this paper, appears indirectly to contribute to such desired outcomes, promoting au-
diting agencies in poor countries ought to be a prioritized area within development aid. The inde-
pendent significant effects of the three principles of good government auditing indicate that these 
three areas could be a productive focus of such programs. If independence and communicating, 
also inconvenient, results to the public are difficult to promote due to political constraints, directing 
resources to build knowledge, skills and expertise among the public auditors is a constructive way 
forward to generate better quality of the public sector.   
 
Finally, if there would be no control and monitoring of the public officials, there is an impending 
risk that fraud, corruption and other mismanagement would increase (McCubbins, Noll and 
Weingast 1987). However, a quick empirical lookout in the world tells us that to merely have a 
national audit office conducting audits of the public sector does not produce the desired effect to 
curb such malpractices. In this paper I have demonstrated how auditing actually can play an essen-
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tial role in creating well working public sectors, it yet requires that it is organized according to the 
appropriate principles, i.e. the principles of good government auditing.  
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